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The purpose in this article is to demonstrate that buying more than one
ticket in a lottery is readily explicable in models of utility that permit
gambling at actuarially unfair odds. However, contrary to popular view, we
show this choice cannot be explained in terms of a variance–skew trade-off.
I. Introduction
Hirshleifer (1966) and Golec and Tamarkin (1998),
amongst others, point out that the observed beha-
viour of some gamblers to engage in repetitive small-
stake wagers, to buy more than one lottery ticket in a
draw or to bet on more than one runner in a race is
inconsistent with global risk-seeking behaviour.
Global risk-seeking behaviour is the traditional
explanation for explaining outcomes in gambling
markets. (e.g. Ali (1977) and Quandt (1986)).
It has become quite common to hypothesize that
betting at actuarially unfair odds might be explicable
in terms of a preference for positive skewness of
return, ceteris paribus. For instance Golec and
Tamarkin (1998) state that if bettors are interested in
moments other than the first two then betting more
than one horse in a race can be explained as attempts
by bettors to trade-off variance for skewness.
They also state that bettors may appear to prefer
variance when it is skewness they crave. This idea is
borrowed from the standard expected utility model
where it would appear that for utility functions that
can be legitimately approximated by a Taylor expan-
sion, agents exhibit a preference, ceteris paribus,
for positive skewness.1
In fact the argument is in incorrect in general for
the standard expected utility maximizer. Brockett and
Garven (1998) show that one can always construct
two distributions with a given moment ordering for
which neither stochastically dominates the other at
any degree of stochastic dominance.2
The purpose in this article is to demonstrate that
betting more than one runner in a race or buying
more than one ticket in a lottery is readily explicable
in models of utility that permit gambling at
actuarially unfair odds. However we show this
choice cannot be sensibly explained in terms of a
variance -skew trade-off or a preference for skewness.
The models we employ are an expected utility model
with an expo-cubic specification (see e.g. Friedman
and Savage (1948) and the nonexpected model of
utility of Markowitz (1952).3 We construct examples
in which the agent chooses between two lotteries,
*Corresponding author. E-mail: d.peel@lancaster.ac.uk
1 This is because the third derivative of the utility function of a globally risk-averse agent is positive and therefore appears to
imply a valid trade-off between mean, variance and skewness of return, that is, preferring a higher third moment for two
random variables having equal means and variances.
2 They prove and demonstrate with examples that expected utility preferences never universally translate into moment
preferences. Cain and Peel (2004) also illustrate the potential fallacy in the context of simple gambles.
3We can obtain the same outcomes in Cumulative Prospect theory proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky
and Kahneman (1992) or Rank-Dependent expected utility of Quiggin (1993). However probability distortion, a key element
of their models, demand more space than is available here.






























A and B and prefers to buy more than one ticket in
lottery A, even though it offers a lower expected
return and less positive skewness than lottery B,
which has the same variance.
The rest of the article is structured as follows.
In the next section we set out our analysis and the
final section of the article is a brief conclusion.
II. Some Analysis
The expo-cubic function
We model the Friedman–Savage expected utility
function by the expo-power form. This function has
the form envisaged by Friedman and Savage. It has
the properties that utility is initially concave, then
convex and finally concave over wealth. In addition
the function is bounded from above, a sufficient
condition for the resolution of the St Petersburg
Paradox. The function, which nests the standard
cubic specification. Utility, U, is given by
U ¼ 1
a
1 ea wbw2þcw3ð Þ
h i
where w is wealth and a, b and c are positive
constants with c > ð4b=3Þ to ensure that marginal
utility is everywhere positive. As a! 0 by L’Hopitals
rule we obtain the standard cubic function.
Our specification obviates the theoretical problem
of unbounded risk-seeking behaviour over
large enough wealth levels in the standard specifica-
tion. For ease of modelling, though the points made
are generic, we assume that a lottery has a fixed
number of tickets (T ) each costing $1. This is the
form many lotteries take, e.g. those in airports. The
set up is also applicable to betting on more than one
number at roulette. Buying more than one ticket in a
lottery is analogous to betting more than one runner
in the race but is a convenient simplification of the
analysis.
The moments of return for this type lottery are
given by
ER ¼ pTfðO ðT 1ÞÞg þ ð1 pT ÞðT Þ ¼ T
2 ¼ Tð1þ Þ
2ð1 pT Þ
p
3 ¼ Tð1þ Þ
3ð1 pT Þð1 2pT Þ
p2
 ¼ pO ð1 pÞ
where ER is the expected return from purchasing T
tickets in the lottery. p is the probability of one ticket
winning. O are the odds against one ticket winning. 
is the expected return to a one unit bet (i.e. T¼ 1).
2 is the variance of return and 3 the skewness
of return.
In order to gamble on the lottery we require that
expected utility, EU, from betting
EU ¼ pT 1 eaðwþbðwþÞ2þcðwþÞ3
h i
þ ð1 pT Þ 1 eaðwTbðwT ÞÞ2þcðwT Þ3
h i
is greater or equal to the utility of not betting.
We employ the following parameters in our
example.
a ¼ 0:0000001, b ¼ 0:5, c ¼ 0:43333:
The agent is risk-averse for wealth levels less than
0.385, risk seeking for wealth levels up 249.1 and risk-
averse for wealth levels greater than this.
Consider the choice between the two lotteries,
A and B.
In LotteryA : p ¼ 0:01, O ¼ 89,
ER ¼ 3:7,  ¼ 0:1
In lottery B : p ¼ 4:2882 104,
O ¼ 2097:8, ER ¼ 0:1, ¼ 0:1:
As we observe in Fig.1 in this example the agent
would optimally choose to buy 37 tickets in lottery A.
Purchasing one (or any number) ticket in lottery B
has negative net utility. However the moments of
lottery A and lottery B for purchasing 37 tickets and
1 ticket, respectively are given by
A : ERðAÞ ¼ 3:7,
2ðAÞ ¼ 1888:1, 3ðAÞ ¼ 44182 and
B : ER ðBÞ ¼ 0:1, 2ðBÞ ¼ 1888:1,
3ðBÞ ¼ 4:8881 106:
In other words the variance of the two gambles
is equal but the expected return of and positive skew
of lottery A is lower than in lottery B. Nevertheless
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Fig. 1. Expected utility in excess of not gambling





























In a seminal paper Markowitz (1952) assumed that
from an agent’s customary or normal level of wealth
the agent was initially risk loving then risk-averse
over gains whilst initially risk-adverse then risk
seeking over losses. He also assumed that the typical
agent was loss averse so that the curve falls faster
to the left of the origin than it rises to the right.
(i.e. UðXÞ > jUðXÞ,X > 0Þj00
For our parametric specification of the Markowitz
we employ the expo-power function (see Saha (1993))
and for the agent to gamble we require
EU ¼ pT 1 erðOðT1ÞÞn
 
 ð1 pTÞk 1 eT n   0
where r,, k and n are positive constants with n>1
r 1, k> r.
With n>1 the agent is risk–loving, (risk-averse),
over gains as (n 1)/rn is greater, (less), than
(O (T 1))n and risk-averse, risk loving over
losses as (n1)/n is greater, less, than T n.
The degree of loss aversion varies between r/k for
symmetric small gambles and 1/k for large symmetric
gambles.
Our parameter values are r¼ 50, k¼ 100,
¼ 1 109 and n¼ 1.5.
In Lottery A : p ¼ 1 106, O ¼ 899999,
ER ¼ 5,  ¼ 0:1
In lottery B : p ¼ 2:00009996 108,
O ¼ 4:499775 107,
ER ¼ 0:1, ¼ 0:1:
From a utility perspective, lottery A with a
purchase of 50 tickets is preferred to purchasing 1
ticket in lottery B even though the variance of return
in lottery B is identical to that in A and has a higher
expected return and higher positive skew.4
III. Conclusion
Depending on the parameters of the utility function
and the lottery structure an agent can optimally
choose to purchase zero, one or more tickets in
a lottery. We have constructed examples where
we model utility by either the Friedman–Savage or
Markowitz form and the agent optimally purchases
more than one ticket. These lotteries have the same
variances but lower expected returns and skewness of
returns than those generated by the purchase of one
ticket in alternative lotteries. Nevertheless they are
preferred from a utility perspective. The examples
therefore illustrate that arguments to explain
gambling based on higher moments, and in particular
a variance–skewness trade-off can be invalid.
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If we define the current level of wealth as W, and the
level of utility associated with W as U
U ¼ UþUðWþ xÞ ðaÞ
defines utility for increases in wealth above W, where
Wþx is wealth measured W to 1. We require
that marginal utility, @U=@x is positive and the
second derivative, @2U=@x2, is initially positive
then negative for an increase in wealth. For a
decrease in wealth below W, we define the utility
function as
U ¼ UUðW xÞ ðbÞ
where W  x is wealth measured 0 to W. We require
that the marginal utility, @U=@x, be positive and the
second derivative, @2U=@x2, be initially negative then
positive for a decrease in wealth as postulated by
Markowitz. These features are exhibited in our
calibrated examples below.
Expected Utility of a gamble over gains (G) and
losses (L) in the Markowitz model is given by
EU ¼ pUðGÞ  ð1 pÞUðLÞ ðcÞ
For our expo-power function and the definition of
gains and loses this gives
EU ¼ pT 1 erðOðT1ÞÞnÞ  ð1 pTÞk 1 eT n 

ðdÞ
For the utility function in (c), the degree of
loss aversion, (LA), is defined by the ratio of the
utility gain to the utility loss from a symmetric
gamble, given by
LA ¼ 1 e
rGn 
k 1 eLnð Þ G ¼ L ðeÞ
As stake size approaches zero, the assumption of
loss aversion requires that r/k<1, (by L’Hopital’s
Rule) and as it becomes large that 1/k<1.
From the definition of the moments for a T ticket
purchase in Lottery we obtain
ER ¼ pTfðO ðT 1ÞÞg þ ð1 pTÞðTÞ ¼ T
2 ¼ Tð1þ Þ
2ð1 pT Þ
p
3 ¼ Tð1þ Þ
3ð1 pT Þð1 2pT Þ
p2
 ¼ pO ð1 pÞ
Lottery, B, a one-ticket lottery, has moments
ER ¼ q þ ð1 qÞð1Þ ¼ 
2 ¼ ð1þ Þ
2ð1 qÞ
q
3 ¼ ð1þ Þ
3ð1 qÞð1 2qÞ
q2
where q is the probability of winning in Lottery B and
 are the odds. We set the expected returns for a one-
stake gamble to be equal in both lotteries. In order to







This enables us to calculate , given the rates of
return to a 1-unit gamble are the same.
All calculations were done in Scientific WorkPlace.
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